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Abstract
Peter P. Wakker has forcefully shown the importance for decision theory
of a condition that he called “Cardinal Coordinate Independence”. Indeed,
when the outcome space is rich, he proved that, for continuous weak orders,
this condition fully characterizes the Subjective Expected Utility model with
a finite number of states. He has furthermore explored in depth how this
condition can be weakened in order to arrive at characterizations of Choquet
Expected Utility and Cumulative Prospect Theory. This note studies the
consequences of this condition in the absence of any transitivity assumption.
Complete preference relations satisfying Cardinal Coordinate Independence
are shown to be already rather well-behaved. Under a suitable necessary
Archimedean-like assumption, they may always be represented using a simple
numerical model.
Keywords: Decision under uncertainty, Cardinal Coordinate Independence,
Nontransitive preferences.
JEL: D81
1 Introduction and motivation
The work of Peter P. Wakker on the foundations of decision theory has force-
fully shown how the consideration of induced relations comparing preference
differences between outcomes may illuminate the analysis of models of de-
cision making under uncertainty 1. In order to characterize the Subjective
Expected Utility (SEU) model with a finite number of states, he introduced
a condition called “Cardinal Coordinate Independence” (CCI) 2. This condi-
tion requires that the comparisons of preference differences between outcomes
revealed in different states and using different reference outcomes do not ex-
hibit contradictory information. Using topological assumptions to ensure
that the set of outcomes is “rich”, Wakker showed that CCI fully character-
izes SEU for continuous weak orders (see Wakker, 1984, 1988, 1989a). This
striking result can be extended to more general outcome sets in the algebraic
approach (see Wakker, 1991).
This condition, when appropriately weakened (e.g. requiring it only for
comonotonic acts), may also be used to characterize non-EU models such as
Choquet Expected Utility (see Wakker, 1989a, 1989b, 1994) and Cumulative
Prospect Theory (Wakker & Tversky, 1993). Indeed, CCI and its variants
may be seen as a powerful unifying tool to analyze many models in decision
making under risk and uncertainty (see Wakker & Zank, 1999). Furthermore,
this condition is intimately related to empirical assessment techniques of
utility functions and has served as an inspiring principle for the development
of such techniques (see Abdellaoui, 2000; Bleichrodt & Pinto, 2000; Wakker
& Deneffe, 1996).
In all the above-mentioned papers, it is supposed that the set of outcomes
is rich and that the complete and transitive preferences behave consistently in
this rich structure. Clearly the unnecessary “richness” assumptions interact
with the necessary conditions and it is well-known that this may contribute
to obscure their interpretation (see Furkhen & Richter, 1991; Krantz, Luce,
Suppes, & Tversky, 1971). Furthermore, the weak order assumption is quite
powerful: transitivity clearly plays a vital roˆle in the definition of “standard
sequences” or “grids” (see, e.g. Krantz et al., 1971; Wakker, 1989a). In
view of the importance of CCI, it seems worth investigating its “pure conse-
quences”, i.e. its consequences in the absence of any transitivity requirement
and of any unnecessary structural assumption on the set of outcomes. This
is the purpose of this note.
1A similar idea is already used in Pfanzagl (1971, ch. 9); we thank Peter Wakker for
bringing this point to our attention.
2We use here the terminology of Wakker (1984). This condition is often called “tradeoff
consistency” in Wakker’s later texts, e.g. Wakker (1988, 1989a).
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Rather surprisingly, it turns out that, when coupled with completeness,
CCI already implies that preferences are rather well-behaved. Under a suit-
able necessary Archimedean-like assumption, such preferences may be repre-
sented numerically using a simple model that generalizes the Skew Symmetric
Additive (SSA) model studied in Fishburn (1990b), replacing additivity by
a mere decomposability requirement. Technically (so to speak, since in our
poor framework, the reader should not expect anything that is much in-
volved), our results extend to the case of decision making under uncertainty
the results obtained in Bouyssou and Pirlot (2002a) in the case of conjoint
measurement.
In this note, models tolerating intransitive preferences are simply used
as a framework allowing to understand the pure consequences of some well-
known conditions. They may nevertheless have some interest in themselves.
Indeed, as shown by the famous experiment in Tversky (1969), nontransitive
preferences may be observed in quite a predictable way in decision making
under risk (see however Iveson and Falmagne (1985), for a critical analysis
of this experiment). Furthermore, Fishburn (1991) has challenged, quite
convincingly in our opinion, the usual arguments used to dismiss such models
(for classical and less classical counterarguments, see Raiffa, 1968; Luce,
2000).
This note is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces our setting
and notation. Our main results appear in section 3. A final section discusses
our findings.
2 The setting
2.1 Outcomes, states and acts
We adopt a classical setting for decision under uncertainty with a finite
number of states. Let Γ = {α, β, γ, . . .} be the set of outcomes and N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of states. It is understood that the elements of N are
exhaustive and mutually exclusive: one and only one state will turn out to
be true. An act is a function from N to Γ. The set of all acts is denoted
by A = ΓN . Acts will always be denoted by lowercase letters a, b, c, d, . . . An
act a ∈ A therefore associates to each state i ∈ N an outcome a(i) ∈ Γ. We
often abuse notation and write ai instead of a(i). Among the elements of A
are constant acts, i.e. acts giving the same outcome in all states. We denote
by α the constant act giving the outcome α ∈ Γ in all states i ∈ N .
Let E ⊆ N and a, b ∈ A. We denote by aEb the act c ∈ A such that
ci = ai, for all i ∈ E and ci = bi, for all i ∈ N \E. Similarly αEb will denote
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the act d ∈ A such that di = α, for all i ∈ E and di = bi, for all i ∈ N \ E.
When E = {i} we write aib and αib instead of a{i}b and α{i}b.
2.2 Preferences on acts
In this note, % will always denote a reflexive binary relation on the setA. The
binary relation % is interpreted as an “at least as good as” preference relation
between acts. We denote by  (resp. ∼) the asymmetric (resp. symmetric)
part of%. A similar convention holds when% is starred, superscripted and/or
subscripted.
We say that state i ∈ N is influent (for %) if there are α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ and
a, b ∈ A such that αia % βib and Not [γia % δib] and degenerate otherwise. It
is clear that a degenerate state has no influence whatsoever on the comparison
of the elements of A and may be suppressed from N . In order to avoid
unnecessary minor complications, we suppose henceforth that all states in
N are influent. Note that, in general, this does not rule out the existence of
null states i ∈ N , i.e. such that aic ∼ bic, for all a, b, c ∈ A. A state will be
said essential if it is not null.
We denote by %Γ the relation induced on the set of outcomes Γ by the
relation % on A, i.e., for all α, β ∈ Γ, α %Γ β ⇔ α % β.
2.3 Comparing preference differences between outcomes
Consistently with Wakker (1988, 1989a), our analysis uses induced relations
comparing preference differences on the set of outcomes. Note that our defi-
nitions differ from his, although we use similar notation.
The idea that any binary relation generates various reflexive and transi-
tive binary relations called traces dates back at least to the pioneering work
of R. Duncan Luce (Luce, 1956). The use of traces has proved especially
useful in the study of preference structures tolerating intransitive indiffer-
ence such as semiorders or interval orders (see Aleskerov & Monjardet, 2002;
Fishburn, 1985; Pirlot & Vincke, 1997). We pursue here the same idea using
traces on preference differences.
Definition 1 (Relations comparing preference differences)
Let % be a binary relation on A. We define the binary relations %∗ and %∗∗
on Γ2 letting, for all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ,
(α, β) %∗ (γ, δ) if [for all a, b ∈ A and all i ∈ N, γia % δib⇒ αia % βib],
(α, β) %∗∗ (γ, δ) if [(α, β) %∗ (γ, δ) and (δ, γ) %∗ (β, α)].
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By construction, %∗ and %∗∗ are reflexive and transitive. Therefore, ∼∗ and
∼∗∗ are equivalence relations. Note that, by construction, %∗∗ is reversible,
i.e. (α, β) %∗∗ (γ, δ) ⇔ (δ, γ) %∗∗ (β, α). Observe that %∗ and %∗∗ may
not be complete: induced comparisons of preference differences may indeed
depend on the reference acts and/or on the state in which they are revealed.
Sweeping consequences will obtain when this is not so.
We note a few useful connections between %∗, %∗∗ and % in the following
lemma that holds independently on any condition on %.
Lemma 1
Let % be a binary relation on A. Then, for all a, b, c, d ∈ A and all i ∈ N ,
[a % b and (ci, di) %∗ (ai, bi)]⇒ cia % dib (1)
[(cj, dj) ∼∗ (aj, bj), for all j ∈ N ]⇒ [a % b⇔ c % d], (2)
[a  b and (ci, di) %∗∗ (ai, bi)]⇒ cia  dib, (3)
[(cj, dj) ∼∗∗ (aj, bj), for all j ∈ N ]⇒
{
a % b⇔ c % d and
a  b⇔ c  d. (4)
Proof
(1) is obvious from the definition of %∗, (2) follows. Suppose that a  b
and (ci, di) %∗∗ (ai, bi). Using (1), we know that cia % dib. Suppose now
that dib % cia. Since (ci, di) %∗∗ (ai, bi) implies (bi, ai) %∗ (di, ci), (1) implies
b % a, a contradiction. Hence (3) holds and (4) follows. 2
2.4 Coordinate independence and cardinal coordinate
independence
Coordinate Independence (CI) is a classical independence condition stating
that the preference between acts is not affected by a common outcome in
some state.
Definition 2 (Condition CI)
Let % be a binary relation on A. This relation is said to satisfy CI if, for
all i ∈ N , all α, β ∈ Γ and all a, b ∈ A,
αia % αib⇒ βia % βib.
It is not difficult to see that if % satisfies CI then, for all E ⊂ N and all
a, b, c, d ∈ A, aEc % bEc⇒ aEd % bEd. Condition CI is therefore equivalent
to postulate P2, often referred to as the “Sure Thing Principle”, introduced
by Savage (1954).
The following definition is adapted from Wakker (1989a, page 80).
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Definition 3 (Condition CCI)
Let % be a binary relation on A. This relation is said to satisfy CCI if:
αia % βib
and
γib % δia
and
δjc % γjd
⇒ αjc % βjd,
for all i, j ∈ N , all a, b, c, d ∈ A and all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ.
We refer to Wakker (1989a) for a thorough discussion of this condition
and to the references in section 1 for a study of its possible variants. Note
that, since we supposed that all degenerate states were suppressed from N ,
we state here the condition for all i, j ∈ N , contrary to Wakker (1989a) who
only states it for essential states i and j. Although influent states may not
be essential, they will turn out to be so for complete relations in presence of
CCI.
Remark 1
Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2001) have recently proposed a weakened version of
CCI, using indifferences instead of preferences in the above definition. They
show that this condition, when coupled with monotonicity, may replace the
original condition in the characterization of SEU (they furthermore show
that such a weakening is also possible starting with the restricted versions
of CCI mentioned above used to characterize Choquet Expected Utility and
Cumulative Prospect Theory). In our nontransitive setting such a weakening
of CCI does not seem to lead, on its own, to interesting restrictions on %.
We do not consider it here. •
3 Results
3.1 CI, CCI and preference differences
Conditions CI and CCI can easily be reformulated using the relations com-
paring preference differences between outcomes introduced above. The, easy,
case of CI is dealt with first.
Proposition 1
Let % be a binary relation on A. Then % satisfies CI if and only if (iff)
(α, α) ∼∗ (β, β), for all α, β ∈ Γ.
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Proof
It is clear that [% satisfies CI] ⇔ [αia % αib ⇔ βia % βib, for all α, β ∈ Γ,
all i ∈ N and all a, b ∈ A] ⇔ [(α, α) ∼∗ (β, β) for all α, β ∈ Γ]. 2
The following summarizes the main consequences of CCI when % is com-
plete.
Lemma 2
Let % be a complete relation on A. If % satisfies CCI then:
1. %∗ is complete,
2. Not [(α, β) %∗ (γ, δ)]⇒ (β, α) %∗ (δ, γ),
3. %∗∗ is complete,
4. % satisfies CI,
5. [a ∼ b and (γ, δ) ∗∗ (ai, bi)] ⇒ γia  δib,
6. all states are essential.
for all a, b ∈ A, all i ∈ N and all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ.
Proof
Part 1. Suppose that %∗ is not complete so that, for some α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ,
Not [(α, β) %∗ (γ, δ)] and Not [(γ, δ) %∗ (α, β)]. By definition, this implies
αia % βib, Not [γia % δib], γjc % δjd, and Not [αjc % βjd], for some i, j ∈ N
and some a, b, c, d ∈ A. Since % is complete, we have δib % γia. Using CCI,
αia % βib, δib % γia and γjc % δjd imply αjc % βjd, a contradiction.
Part 2. Suppose that, for some α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ, Not [(α, β) %∗ (γ, δ)] and
Not [(β, α) %∗ (δ, γ)]. By definition, we have γia % δib, Not [αia % βib], δjc %
γjd and Not [βjc % αjd], for some i, j ∈ N and some a, b, c, d ∈ A. Since % is
complete, we have βib % αia. Using CCI, βib % αia, γia % δib and δjc % γjd
imply βjc % αjd, a contradiction. Part 3 easily follows from parts 1 and 2.
Part 4. Since %∗∗ is complete and reversible, we have (α, α) ∼∗ (β, β),
for all α, β ∈ Γ. CI therefore follows using proposition 1.
Part 5. Let α = ai and β = bi. Suppose that a ∼ b and (γ, δ) ∗∗ (α, β).
Since we have (γ, δ) %∗ (α, β), we obtain, using (1), γia % δib. Suppose
therefore, in contradiction with the thesis, that δib % γia. Since %∗∗ is
complete, (γ, δ) ∗∗ (α, β) ⇔ Not [(α, β) %∗∗ (γ, δ)] ⇔ [(γ, δ) ∗ (α, β) or
(β, α) ∗ (δ, γ)].
Suppose that (γ, δ) ∗ (α, β). This implies that there are c, d ∈ A such
that, for some j ∈ N , γjc % δjd and Not [αjc % βjd]. Now αia % βib,
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δib % γia and γjc % δjd imply, using CCI, αjc % βjd, a contradiction. The
case (β, α) ∗ (δ, γ) is similar.
Part 6. By hypothesis, each state i ∈ N is influent. Therefore there are
α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ and a, b ∈ A such that αia % βib and Not [γia % δib] (and,
hence, δib  γia, since % is complete). If γic  δic or δic  γic for some
c ∈ A, then state i ∈ N is essential by construction. Suppose therefore that
γic ∼ δic, for all c ∈ A.
It is easy to show that when % is complete and satisfies CCI, if any of
the premises of CCI holds with  instead of %, the conclusion of CCI must
hold with . Now, using CCI, αia % βib, δib  γia and γic ∼ δic imply
αic  βic. Hence state i ∈ N is essential. 2
As was the case with CI, it turns out that CCI can easily be characterized
using our relations comparing preference differences.
Proposition 2
Let % be a complete relation on A. Then % satisfies CCI iff %∗∗ is complete
and [a ∼ b and (γ, δ) ∗∗ (ai, bi)] ⇒ γia  δib, for all a, b ∈ A, all i ∈ N and
all γ, δ ∈ Γ.
Proof
Necessity results from lemma 2. We show sufficiency. Suppose that αia % βib,
γib % δia and δjc % γjd. In contradiction with CCI suppose that βjd  αjc.
By definition, δjc % γjd and Not [αjc % βjd] imply Not [(α, β) %∗ (δ, γ)], so
that (δ, γ) ∗∗ (α, β), since %∗∗ is complete. Now αia % βib and (δ, γ) ∗∗
(α, β) imply δia  γib, a contradiction. 2
The above proposition shows that a complete binary relation % on A
that satisfies CCI is already quite well structured: there is a reversible weak
order comparing preference differences between outcomes and % is strictly
monotonic w.r.t. this relation. The additional strength of CCI compared to
CI should be apparent considering their respective impact on %∗ and %∗∗.
On its own, CI, even when coupled with completeness, does not imply that
any of our relations comparing preference differences are complete.
Our experience is that the structuring of preferences brought by CCI
is even more apparent considering its consequences in terms of numerical
representations to which we now turn.
3.2 Numerical representations
We envisage a model in which:
a % b⇔ F (p(a1, b1), p(a2, b2), . . . , p(an, bn)) ≥ 0 (M)
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where p is a real-valued function on Γ2 that is skew symmetric (i.e. p(α, β) =
−p(β, α)) and F is a real-valued function on p(Γ2)n that is increasing in all
its arguments and odd (i.e. such that F (x) = −F (−x), abusing notation in
an obvious way). As shown below, model (M) turns out to have close links
with CCI.
Proposition 3
Suppose that Γ is finite or countably infinite. A binary relation % on A
satisfies model (M) iff it is complete and satisfies CCI.
Proof
Necessity. The completeness of % follows from the skew-symmetry of p and
the oddness of F . Suppose now that CCI is violated so that αia % βib,
γib % δia, δjc % γjd and Not [αjc % βjd].
Using model (M) we have, abusing notation,
F (p(α, β),K−i) ≥ 0,
F (p(γ, δ),−K−i) ≥ 0,
F (p(δ, γ),L−j) ≥ 0,
F (p(α, β),L−j) < 0.
Using the oddness of F , its increasingness and the skew symmetry of p, the
first and the second inequalities imply p(α, β) ≥ p(δ, γ), whereas the third
and the fourth imply p(δ, γ) > p(α, β), a contradiction.
Sufficiency. Since % is complete and satisfies CCI, we know from lemma 2
that %∗∗ is complete so that it is a weak order. This implies that %∗ is a weak
order. Therefore, since Γ is finite or countably infinite, there is a real-valued
function q such that, for all α, β, γ, δ ∈ Γ,
(α, β) %∗ (γ, δ)⇔ q(α, β) ≥ q(γ, δ). (5)
Using any such function q, define p letting, for all α, β ∈ Γ, p(α, β) = q(α, β)−
q(β, α). It is easy to show that p is skew-symmetric and represents %∗∗.
Define F letting, for all a, b ∈ A,
F (p(a1, b1), p(a2, b2), . . . , p(an, bn)) =
exp(
∑n
i=1 p(ai, bi)) if a  b,
0 if a ∼ b,
− exp(−∑ni=1 p(ai, bi)) otherwise. (6)
The well-definedness of F follows from (4). It is odd by construction since% is
complete. Let us show that it is increasing. Suppose that p(α, β) > p(ai, bi).
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If a  b, we obtain, using (3), αia  βib and the conclusion follows from
the definition of F . If a ∼ b, we obtain, using lemma 2, αia  βib and
the conclusion follows from the definition of F . If b  a, we have either
βib  αia, βib ∼ αia, or αia  βib. In either case, the conclusion follows
from the definition of F . 2
Remark 2
Before tackling the general case, let us note that the uniqueness properties of
the functions used in model (M) are clearly quite weak. Since we do not study
this model for its own sake but as a framework allowing us to understand the
consequences of a number of requirements on %, we do not study them here;
an analysis of these properties is easily inferred from the results in Bouyssou
and Pirlot (2002b). •
The extension of proposition 3 to sets of arbitrary cardinality is straight-
forward. Let 〈F, p〉 be a representation of % in model (M). It is clear that
we must have:
(α, β) ∗∗ (γ, δ)⇒ p(α, β) > p(γ, δ). (7)
Hence, when model (M) holds, the weak order %p induced on Γ2 by p refines
%∗∗. A necessary condition for model (M) to hold is Γ2 has a finite or
countable order dense subset for %p (see Fishburn, 1970; Krantz et al., 1971).
Since this weak order refines %∗∗, it is clear that Γ2 will then have a finite or
countable order dense subset for %∗∗. Let us call OD the assertion that Γ2
has a finite or countable order dense subset for %∗∗. We have shown that OD
is necessary for model (M). The proof of proposition 3 shows that adding
this condition to the completeness of % and CCI is also sufficient for (M).
We omit the cumbersome and apparently uninformative reformulation of OD
in terms of %. We have thus proved the following.
Theorem 1
A binary relation % on A satisfies model (M) iff it is complete and satisfies
CCI and OD.
Using model (M), it is easy to derive more consequences of the combination
of completeness and CCI. We omit the simple proof of the following, which
shows that, in spite of the absence of transitivity of %, model (M) implies
many of the usual monotonicity properties of the SEU model.
Proposition 4
Let % be a binary relation on A satisfying model (M). Then for all a, b ∈ A,
all α, β ∈ Γ and all nonempty E ⊂ N ,
1. [ai %Γ bi for all i ∈ N ]⇒ [a % b],
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2. [ai %Γ bi for all i ∈ N and aj Γ bj for some j ∈ N ]⇒ [a  b],
3. αEa % βEa⇔ α %Γ β.
Remark 3
It may be instructive to analyze which of the classical postulates used in
Savage (1954) (excluding P6 and P7, which are not pertinent in our setting
with a finite number of states) are satisfied by model (M). It is not difficult
to see that model (M) keeps all of P2 (since CI holds), P3 (in view of part 3
of proposition 4) and P5 (it is easy to see that α Γ β ⇔ p(α, β) > 0, which
must be true for some α, β if all states are to be influent; this implies that
 cannot be empty). It keeps only the completeness part of P1, abandoning
transitivity. Simple examples show that model (M) may violate postulate
P4. As should be apparent from its formulation, model (M) does not, in
general, allow tastes to be separated from beliefs. •
Remark 4
Consider now model (M ′), which is obtained from model (M) abandoning the
increasingness of F in its arguments. In order to better appreciate the relative
strengths of CI and CCI, it is interesting to note that the conjunction of
completeness and CI is tantamount to (M ′). We show this below in the case
of a finite or countably infinite set Γ, leaving to the reader, the, easy, task of
extending the result to the general case (this requires limiting the cardinality
of Γ2/∼∗∗).
Proposition 5
Suppose that Γ is finite or countably infinite. A binary relation % on A
satisfies model (M ′) iff it is complete and satisfies CI.
Proof
Necessity. The completeness of % follows from the skew-symmetry of p and
the oddness of F . CI follows from p(α, α) = 0 and F (0) = 0.
Sufficiency. Let ≥Γ be any linear order on Γ, i.e. a complete, antisymmet-
ric and transitive relation. Consider the set Υ = {(α, β) : α, β ∈ Γ and α >Γ
β}, where >Γ denotes the asymmetric part of ≥Γ. Since Γ is finite or count-
ably infinite, so is Υ. Therefore, there is a one-to-one function q between Υ
and some subset of N \ {0}.
Define p on Γ2 letting, for all α, β ∈ Γ,
p(α, β) = q(α, β) if (α, β) ∈ Υ,
p(α, β) = 0 if α = β,
p(α, β) = −q(β, α) if α 6= β and (α, β) /∈ Υ.
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By construction, p is skew symmetric. Using such a p define F letting:
F (p(a1, b1), . . . , p(an, bn)) =

+1 if a  b,
0 if a ∼ b,
−1 otherwise.
(8)
By construction, p(α, β) = p(γ, δ) implies [α = β and γ = δ]. Since, %
satisfies CI, we know from proposition 1 that (α, α) ∼∗ (γ, γ) so that
(α, α) ∼∗∗ (γ, γ). This shows, using (4), that F is well-defined. It is odd
since % is complete. 2
Remark 5
In Bouyssou and Pirlot (2002a), we consider several models that, when trans-
lated into the framework of decision under uncertainty, fall “in between”
(M ′) and (M), e.g. a model in which F is odd and nondecreasing in all its
arguments. The analysis of such models is straightforward adequately refor-
mulating the conditions introduced in Bouyssou and Pirlot (2002a). •
4 Discussion
It may be interesting to briefly compare theorem 1 with the characterization
of SEU proposed by Wakker (1989a). We recall his result below considering
only the case in which there are at least 2 states and all states are influent
(and, hence, essential).
Theorem (Wakker (1989a, Th. IV.2.7, page 83))
Suppose that Γ is a connected topological space and endow A with the product
topology. Suppose that n ≥ 2 and that all states are influent. There is a
continuous real valued function u on Γ and n positive real numbers pi that
add up to 1 such that, for all a, b ∈ A,
a % b⇔
n∑
i=1
piu(ai) ≥
n∑
i=1
piu(bi), (SEU)
iff
• % is complete,
• % satisfies CCI,
• % is continuous (i.e. the sets {a ∈ A : a  b} and {a ∈ X : b  a} are
open for all b ∈ A),
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• % is transitive.
Furthermore, u is unique up to a scale and location and the pi are unique.
Theorem 1 abandons the topological assumptions on Γ and, hence conti-
nuity. It also drops transitivity. Given such differences, it is rather surprising
that, as already observed, the resulting model (M) keeps a number of impor-
tant properties of model (SEU). This is an indication of the power of CCI
combined with completeness.
It should be noted that model (M) is far from being the only possible
model taking intransitivities into account in decision making under uncer-
tainty. Models of this type have already been suggested in Fishburn (1984,
1988, 1989, 1990b), Fishburn and Lavalle (1987b, 1987a), Lavalle and Fish-
burn (1987), Nakamura (1998). Most of these models are closely related to
model (M) but use an additive F together with probabilities for each state.
The closest to model (M) is the Skew Symmetric Additive (SSA) model with
a finite number of states introduced in Fishburn (1990b). This model uses
the following numerical representation:
a % b⇔
n∑
i=1
piΦ(xi, yi) ≥ 0, (SSA)
where pi are positive real numbers that add up to one and Φ is a skew
symmetric real-valued function on Γ2.
It is not difficult to see that this model implies the completeness of % as
well as CCI. The characterization proposed in Fishburn (1990b) requires a
rich topological structure for Γ and a formulation of continuity adapted to
the nontransitive case. The necessary axioms that are used (i.e. axioms 3–5)
have close connections with CCI while being collectively stronger.
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